The Just State : Observations on Gustav von Schmoller`s Political Theory by Reheis, Fritz
 https://doi.org/10.20378/irbo-54482
The Just State: Observations 
on Gustav von Schn1oller' s 
Political Theory 
by 
Fritz Reheis 
University of Cobu1g 
Fifty years ago, five years after the National Socialists had taken over 
power in Germany, Leopold von Wiese posed the following question 
in the commemorative publication for Schmoller's hundredth birthday: 
whether Schmoller would have rejected or welcomed the political 
development of recent years. The answer was in the affirmative. Even 
if after Schmoller's death some things had changed in Germany, now 
there had existed since 1933 yet again a "reorganised" civil servant 
officialdom and a State leader, who "stood as equally close to or distant 
from the lower as from the upper classes and he knew only one ideal 
of justice towards all people ... The deepest binding common interest, 
which the younger generation ought to perceive in the great Swabian, 
lies •.. in the faith in the power and the strength of the personality"[l]. 
I would like to set this quotation against another, taken from a book 
published in 1987 about great Berlin scholars. There Rüdiger von Bruch 
writes that the repetitive use of Schmoller's writing "in the sense of 
the 'Volksgemeinschaftsideologie'" and "in the sense of a 'deutsch-
tümelnden Ganzheitsdenkens' " in fact had very little in common with 
Schmoller and his works[2]. 
These two conflicting evaluations illustrate how little Schmoller's 
political concepts, his State theory, have been taken in up to now. I 
,vould like to tackle Schmoller's political theory, and first of all I want 
to consider Schmoller's criticism of the liberals' political ideas. After 
that I will portray Schmoller's view of the State and put this into 
perspective as regards his general theory on society. I will make a 
comment about any similarity tobe drawn between Schmoller and the 
National Socialists in their way of thinking. Thirdly I will go into the 
social historical origins for Schmoller's "Just State". 
The Error of Liberalism 
The origins of Schmoller' s political theory are to be found in the dispute over 
the basic ideas of liberalism. lt would, therefore, be appropriate to consider first 
of all how Schmoller regarded the political concepts of libera1ism[3, pp. 63f~. For 
the liberals the freedom of the individual is, of course, the greatest good. As a 
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result of this they regard with extreme scepticism any kind of institution, but in 
particular the state, which could place this freedom in jeopardy. 
Schmoller no longer regards this fear of the state by the liberals as acute. In 
his opinion the liberals regarded all political institutions as being similar to those 
existing in absolute regimes. But a rejection of obsolete institutions can never 
be a reason for rejecting all political institutions in general. In addition, the liberals' 
fear of institutions ossifying and thereby curbing progress is considered by 
------- Schmoller as unfounded. The flexibility of political institutions is exemplified in 
the very fact that they have indeed changed in the course of time. Furthermore, 
in recent times completely new groupings such as eo-operative societies, trade 
unions, limited companies, cartels, insurance companies, alongside of factory and 
work legislation, have come into being. 
If one forgets for a moment the danger of political institutions ossifying, the 
<langer of the state being manipulated by certain elements still remains. lt is here 
that Schmoller sees the basic dilemma of every state: "In every state's power 
are to be found two opposing motives and tendencies: Law and equity must be 
inherent here and thereby aim to execute justice for all. But the state often veers 
toward the dangers of falling victim to egoism, to avarice and to the whims of the 
rulers and the mighty" [3, p. 956]. 
The Political Theory of the Just State 
The CoJ1slilulion aJld lhe Jus/ S/ale 
The mistake of all constitutions up to now in Schmoller's opinion was that they 
were unable to ensure the state's monopoly of power over a langer period of time. 
\Vithout this monopoly of power the state can neither, at home nor at its frontiers, 
fulfil its task of guaranteeing peace[3, pp.278ff, pp. 954ff, pp. 1,003f~. The history 
of constitutions shows that the state has again and again been subject to abuse 
by the bearers of its powers as a means to further private interests. The basic 
problem of a modern constitution of any lasting quality lies in its having a both 
stronger and better trained state machine as a counterweight to exist alongside 
powerful and adroit social forces. 
Schmoller is convinced that in the modem-day constitutional monarchies of 
Europe the correct combination of strength and flexibility has been found. The 
manner in which a monarchy is inherited and the civil service standing at its disposal 
guarantee a proper mixture of continuity and change. The constitutional monarchy 
is a good warrant for all classes being conceded their share of 11legitimate influence" 
on the political decisions. If every dass enjoys the amount of influence which it 
should justly be accorded, then the danger of one particular dass having too much 
dominance is averted. Schmoller, it is true, does not rule out the possibility of 
the republic form of state being adopted at some time in the future, but ''up to 
now scarcely anything has harne such a semblance"[3, p. 1,004]. 
How might it proceed with the development of constitutions in the future? 
Schmoller believes that in every political community there must be a political group 
of leaders, responsible for maintaining order, and the obeying masses. In this 
respect every political community possesses an element which dominates and 
rules. If, in addition, the masses make the resolutions and these are the basis 
on which the leaders rule then it is in this procedure that the eo-operative element 
can be seen. Schmoller presupposes that a dominating and a eo-operative element 
is present in every community. 
Which of these two elements prevails in an actual society depends, above all, 
on two conditions. The first is the size and complexity of the aforementioned 
community. The larger and more complex it is, the more tasks there are which 
its leaders must take over and therefore they must pose as all the morc pO\verful. 
That is why in )arge and complex communities the ruling element gains the mastery 
in the constitution. On the other band, in smaller and less complex communities 
it is the eo-operative element which has the upper hand. The second condition 
is the extent to which the community is threatened from both within and without. 
P.Jrticularly in the case where an enemy from without presents a threat, then 
it is of paramount importance that the rulers dispel any unrest from within as swiftly 
as possible[3, p. 52]. 
If one examines at this point SchmoUer's Iine of reasoning more closely, it will 
become clear why constitutional matters can only be of a pragmatic nature for 
him. In the final analysis it is of little significance whether the state is a concern 
of the people {a republic) or a concern of the prince (a monarchy), because in 
each case the ruler, even if he usurped his power, must basically, if he is astute, 
accommodate the legitimate interests of those he rules. Otherwise by not doing 
so, he may lose his power within a short time[3, p. 1,004]. Especially in uncertain 
times, according to Schmoller, every community out of pure self-interest chooses 
or accepts those people as leaders who are best capable of defending the 
conummity, in other words, the most experienced wruriors and the most competent 
commanders. Evcn if in the course of history Ute struggle of communities has 
become rnore of an intellectual and moral conflict, this basic tenet remains valid 
for Schmoller: the Ieadership should be in the hands of the person who can achieve 
the most for the community in that particular situation. 
Schmoller' s intellectual consent to authoritarian constitutions, which in certain 
situations always act in the interest of the citizens, can be explained by his scant 
regard for the masses, who in the last instance must always be guided by leader 
figures. "Like the hypnotiser and his medium, so too are ·Ieaders capable of 
spellbinding the masses everywhere''[3, p. 10). These persons, leaders by nature, 
are those, who, by always being the first to recognise or evoke notions which 
point to the future, are indispensable for the community. With a background of 
such statements it is understandable that Schmoller warns against a further 
democratisation of the Prussian state, especially in view of the threats from beyond 
its frontiers[3, p. 323). In addition, he regarded giving women the right to vote 
or introducing equal election rights on a comrnunal level as hannful experiments[4]. 
The democratic system of dass domination is for Schmoller, in comparison with 
the aristocratic one, "even worse"{4, p. 1,003). 
The consequence is here that emotion gets the upper band instead of reason 
and common sense{4, p. 1,013), which portends from a certain point onwards, as 
in Antiquity, the disintegration of the State(4, p. 990]. The threatened community, 
being in this situation of weakness, inevitably finds itself a victim of its enemies, 
who will proceed to establish their foreign rule. 
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96 relationship constitutes the political element[6], according to Schmitt. The form _______ of law and order in this community results accordingly from the consequences 
of this threat. In order to ward off the <langer of this community breaking up in 
the pursuit of their own particular interests, Schmoller pleads like Schmitt fot 
the establishment of a civil senant state with a strong executive apex; the regulative 
idea of ruling the state is found in "neutral" and "impartial objectivity"[7]. 
In contrast to Schmitt's plebiscitary "Ftihrerdemokratie", the political concepl 
of the National Socialists went one step further: In view of the constant struggle 
for existence the ''democratic principle of the masses'' must be repudiated ir1 
favour of the ''aristocratic principle of the personality' ', which Leopold von \Viese 
(cf. introduction) praised Schmoller so much for. 
As regards our topic it simply needs tobe noted that in Schmoller's politica! 
way of thinking some aspects are to be found, in which the authors of bis jubilee 
publication fifty years ago bad little difficulty in discovering something commendable 
to say. 
T/ze Social Culture and tlze Just State 
The arguments expressed up to now, with which Schmoller wants to regairi 
confidence in the power of the state, will not persuade any truly convinced liberal; 
the ,vay, in which Schmoller's theory ,vas assimilated by the following generatiom 
emphasised this mistrust. Why cannot the hereditary monarch with his trainec 
army of civil servants abuse the power of the state for his own particular interest~ 
in the same way as any other bearer of power can? How is it to be guaranteec 
that every dass will get indeed its due share of ''legitimate influence'' over the 
state? \Vho indeed can define this degree of legitimacy which each group should 
get accordingly? Is not Schmoller's political theory a dircct invitation for thosc 
in power, particularly in ]arge and complex states, to call in the spectre of menace: 
as justification of authoritarian politics and thereby open all gates to despotismi 
In the liberal's opinion, the power of the State serves exclusively to secure thE 
civil rights of the people, and the latter play in Schmoller's State theory a quite 
suöordinate role. In the index of Schmoller's Gnmdriß the liberal will search ir 
vain for the terms "civil rights" or "basic rights"[8). Schmoller's political linc 
of thought is quite different: He is not enquiring about conditions which wil 
guarantee the bom rights of freedom and equality for the individual in a society1 
but rather about the conditions which help to uphold the state's monopoly on powet 
in this community. This question does not result from an a pn·on· deduction, a~ 
is the case in the axiom of natural right, but rather as a consequence of observin! 
the history of state constitutions and their repetition of anomalies. 
But where do the criteria originale which ascribe the due amount of influence 
to the respective classes? In order to answer this question Schmoller goes bad 
historically one step, namely to the area of customs. Political order, which is se1 
in legal norms, embraces the indispensable sphere for the community within the 
entirety of customs[3, pp. 41-75]. Because of its essential significance this crucial 
sphere has been coupled in the course of its historical development with penal 
stipulations, over which the state's executive presides. For Schmoller the state 
and its laws are the ''crystallisation'' of the much older moral way of life of the 
community. 
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and evil are of decisive importance in ascertaining the a priori legitimacy of the -------
state. During the evolution of these moral values Schmoller observes a clear 
tendency: the relentless struggle to ensure that the concept of justice might 
prevail{3, pp. 74-5}. Every human being and every community harbours a strong 
desire for a fair practice of justice. 
\Vhen a part contributes to the well-being of the whole, it should get the 
equivalent back[9]. When the individual renders his community a service, he should 
be rewarded by the latter, too; the same applies for the achievements of a smaller 
community on behalf of a larger one, to which it belongs. A criterion for the 
comparison of qualitatively dissimilar achievements is "the emotional reaction of 
the people' ', the ''spiritual and inner life'' of the community. Applied in a political 
sense, this means the legitimate power and the legitimate influence of the individual 
or dass depends on how much this individual or dass does for the good of the 
community. This is for Schmoller the law of progress in the history of mankind, 
the ''necessary product of our moral disposition and our logical ,vay of thinking'' 
f 9, p. 260]. The disregard for the principle of democracy as against the aristocratic 
principle is nothing less than the political materialisation of this law. 
The Social Historical Origins of Schmoller's Political Theory 
First of all, I would like to recall the social historical foundation of liberalism. 
Liberalism was founded on an economy of simple goods production, although this 
was only apparent on a rudimentary Jevel{IO]. As regards the economic organisation 
of the society, it ,vas considered possible to create a market of perfect competition, 
where alongside natural conditions the preferences of the consumers would 
determine what should happen. As regards the form of political organisation it 
was considered possible to succeed with an absolute minimum of State intervention. 
In public discourse free and equal citizens were to decree what rules should 
generally be enforced and regarded thereby as law. In the liberal concept free 
discourse would guarantee that these Iaws represented a high degree of common 
sense and reasoning, and at the same time the wishes of the people. Of decisive 
significance is that free discourse be guaranteed constitutionally with the pertinent 
basic rights (freedom of opinion and the right of assembly). 
Tue actual social historical development, however, pursued, as is known, another 
course, far different from that prophesied by the Iiberals. 
As far as intemal affairs are concerned, these economic and political changes 
in the bourgeois society are usually described as the evolution of the State to 
intervention, and with regard to foreign affairs as imperialism. This development 
continued alongside respective changes in the political culture andin the inclividual's 
political behaviour. The capability of interest groups to organise themselves and 
pursue conflicts in the pluralistic game of power requires of its members a certain 
International feeling of solidarity with the group. Tue manner in which national states are able 
Journal of Social to prove their point in power politics on the world's stage renders a strong national 
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98 or making the best use of a situation for one's own individual advantage, collective _______ egoism ,vas the order of the day. 
On what basis is the group to organise its co-operation? How is the individual 
profit gained through co-operation to be divided? \Vhereas in the liberal model 
of competition the distribution was quasi taken care of by the price, here a new 
principle has to be found. Here the principle of justice or proportionality is of 
importance. \Vhat is achieved for the group by the individual sbould be rewarded 
accordingly. Everyone knows tbat the individual advantage is all the greater, the 
more successfully the group is able to compete with other groups. Therefore the 
individual maximises bis advantage by submitting bis interests to tbe group and 
trusting in the just distribution of the common prize. The same system is valid 
for the behaviour of small groups (e.g. pressure groups), in confrontation with 
the Iarger one (e.g. the state). 
Collectivist theories, like Schmoller's, are splendidly suited for explaining the 
indispensable group morale in this new phase of the bourgeois society. \Vhereas 
liberalism was extremely amoral and with little sense for emotional value, because 
it ,vas founded on egoism and any progress or unity ,vas a result of pure cool 
calculation and reasoning, for the collectivist theoretician the feeling of solidarity 
is critical for the true unity and development of that community. 
In this line of thought energetic representation of tbe interests of individuals 
or groups, which have not had the well-being of the whole as its measuring-rod 
from the beginning, must appear as somewhat morbid. Such behaviour can only 
be compared with the unchecked growth of body cells and organs, and their fatal 
consequences for the person as a whole and must therefore be removed by 
operating. Emancipation can only mean voluntary submission to the recognised 
necessity. The "positive moral" is a moral where the individual makes less 
pretentious demands. 
The result is that Schmoller's collectivist approach corresponds excellently to 
the boUJ&eois society' s change in its form in the late nineteenth century; a transition 
from individual to collective competition and the new concomitant requirements 
of solidarity. The spirit of the community inwardly, animosity outwardly, that is 
Schmoller's formula. lt would be interesting to examine to what extent the 
development of the German working-class movement between 1870-1914 can 
substantiate the practical eff ectiveness of this way of thinking. 
Conclusion 
\Vhat significance does Schmoller have for the present-day discussion of political 
science? lt must be said to Schmoller's credit that the application of his social 
scientific analytical tools by present-day academic observers enables their attention 
to be focused on the whole essence of their subject. This demands a scholarly 
sensitivity for correlations, which are all too easily lost for the screen of perception 
due to methodological individualism and the disintegration of knowledge and studies 
into a multitude of individual disciplines. The registration of such interdisciplinary 
contexts will become in our present time and in the future all the more important, 
the more the world grows together due to the increase in population, due to world 
trade and world traffic[ll]. In addition, due to tbe technical potential achieved 
nowadays the consequences of decisions made today burden innumerable 
generations with an irreversible Ioad - one need only think of atomic power. 
Schmoller's leading question about how the social classes will be able to secure 
their ''legitimate influence'' would, in view of this situation in the Iate twentieth 
century, have to be transferred to particular regions in the world and generations 
of mankind: how can the so-called Third \Vorld get economically and politically 
their due share of the whole world? And how can the basic rights of life be securcd 
for coming generations? Schmoller's all-embracing approach could focus attention 
on such probJems. That a newly awakened need exists today for such academic 
enlightenment is to be seen in the book titles in the academic bestseller lists of 
recent years: Risikogesellschaft, Auf dem n~ in eine andere Modeme, Ökologische 
Kommunikation or Wendezit. 
But Schmoller's approach, however, seems to mein the following respect very 
limited: The application of the justice theorem to political theory Ieads to a circle 
of legitimation of domination. The people in such a case who have the most political 
power are those who do most for the community. The criterion for defining this 
is derived from the Volksempfinden, but if this popular sentiment is defined and 
interpreted by the ruling elite, the circle closes. In this way usurpation can become 
a permanent state of affairs, and thereby the great achievement of the 
Enlightenment, the self•determination of the individual, would be abandoned in 
the realisation of such a political system. 
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